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O c tober 1, 1980 A n ancient quarrel p e rsists a m ong students of P l a t o ' s Prot a g o r a s b e t w e e n those m h o c l a i m that Socrates h i m s e l f h o lds the h e d o n i s t i c t h e s i s 'o n w h i c h h e b a ses his argument against a k rasia (I shall call t h e m " p r o h e d o n i s t s " ) , and those w h o d e n y the c l a i m ("antihedonists") I ) . F e w w i l l den y th a t the m a t t e r at issue is b a s i c to the interpr e t a t i o n o f Plato's e a r l y dia l o g u e s an d h e n c e to the reconstr u c t i o n of the p h i l o s o p h y of Socrates, and until it is resolved, Socrates' p l a c e in the h i s t o r y of m o r a l thought w i l l remain unclear.
The challenges w h i c h eith e r camp mu s t mee t are w e l l k n o w n and considerable. If Socrates does s i ncerely accept h e d o n i s m i n the Protagoras , h o w is h i s h e d o n i s m her e to be r e c onciled w i t h his claims about the supreme i m p ortance o f v i r t u e and the p e r f e c t i o n of the soul, and in p a r t i c u l a r w i t h hi s a t t a c k o n h e d o n i s m i n the Gorgias? 2). If, on the other hand, Socrates does no t ser i o u s l y represent himself as a hedonist, in the argument, w h y does he use h e d o n i s m as a premise in an argument w h o s e c o nclusion h e surely takes seriously,1 and w h y does h e a l l o w h i s interlocutors to take h i m as b e l i e v i n g that p r emise i n all seriousness? If a n e w case is to be m a d e o n e i t h e r side of the issue it mus t b e m a d e on the b a s i s of a close reading of the text, o n a p l ausible account of Socrates' aim s an d s t r a t e g y in the argument, an d on a c o nsideration o f objections tp b o t h sides. In this p a p e r I shall present suc h a case. I'shall argue for the antihedonist int e r p r e t a t i o n b y showing that it is consistent w i t h a natural, un c o n s t r a i n e d r e a d i n g of the text; that it is ac c o u n ted for b y a pla u s i b l e read i n g of Socrates' aims an d m e thods i n a r g uing against a k r a s i a ; that m a j o r objections to it can b e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y answered; a n d that m a j o r obje c t i o n s to a prohedonist: account cannot. If I a m s u ccessful in ea c h aspe c t of the case, the ancient quarrel can, I believe, b e b r o u g h t to a n end.
I ' .
1 shall b e g i n b y ex a m i n i n g c l o sely those p a s s a g e s w i t h i n P r t . 35 lb-358d in w h i c h the hedo n i s t i c thesis is introduced o r r e asserted a n d w h i c h hav e b e e n or c o uld b e taken to support a prohe d o n i s t account. In the examination. I shall limit m y att e n t i o n s t r i c t l y to the issue o f p r o -or antihedonism. Γ r e a d i l y .sacrifice e l e g a n c e to a c c u r a c y in the translations: (a) 351b3-e7;
"Do y o u say, Protagoras," I said, " t h a t (JL) som e m e n live w e l l and others b a d l y ? " H e assented. " T hen does it s e e m to y o u that (2) a m a n w o u l d live w e l l if h e lived in distress and s u f fering?" H e demurred. "(3) W h a t if h e should live a p l e a s a n t life to the end? D o esn't it s e e m to y o u that h e w o u l d t h a y e lived w e l l like that?" "It does , " h e said. "Therefore (ara) (4) livi n g p l e a s a n t l y is good a n d u n p l e a s a n t l y bad." "(5) As lon g as h e lived i n the enjoyment of p r a i s e w o r t h y things (tois k a l o i s ) ," h e said. "What, Protagoras? S u r e l y no t y o u too call (6) some pl e a s a n t things b a d a n d painful things good, as the m a n y do? I mean, (7) aren't they good in that respect in w h i c h they are ple a s a n t -d i s r e g a r d i n g a n y t h i n g els e that m a y come f r o m them? A n d again, aren't p a i n f u l things b a d to the exte n t that they are pai n f u l ? " "I don't know, Socrates," h e said.
"whether I should answer so unquali f i e d l y as y o u ask, that (8) all pleasant things are good and all p a inful things bad; it seems to m e safer, not only w i t h respect to m y p r e s e n t answer, b u t also all the rest of m y life, to answer that (¿* ) some ple a s u r e s are not good and some pains are not bad, thought some are, and thirdly, some (sc. p l easures and pains) are neutral, n e i t h e r good n o r bad." "(9) D o n 't ^ y o u call 'pleasant*," I said, "the things w h i c h p a r t a k e of plea s u r e or w h i c h p r oduce pleasure?" "Indeed I do," h e said. "Then this is w h a t I mean, (7') w h ether things a r e n 't good to the extent that they are pleasant; I 'm asking x^hethef p l e asure itself is n o t good." "As yoxi f r e quently say, Socrates," he said, "let's e x a m i n e it, and if our examination appears reasonable, and p l easant and good should ; t u r n out to b e the same, w e shall be in agreement; if not, w ë shall dispute it then." I shall represent the n u mbered sentences and phrases b y the following statementss I -' ' ' ■ -. Some m e n live x-rell, others badly. ' 2j A m a n lives b a d l y if he lives in distress and suffering...
rti"
¿. A m a n lives xíell if h e lives a p l easant life to the end.
L i v i n g p l e a s a n t l y is good; living u n p l e a s a n t l y is bad.
5. L i ving p l e a s a n t l y is good only if one lives in the e n joyment.of prai s e w o r t h y things.
¿. Some p l easant things, are bad; some painful· things are good.
_7" P l e asant things are good in the respect in wh i c h / t o the extent to w h i c h they are pleasant; painful things are bad in the respect in w h i c h / t o the extent to w h i c h they are painful.
¿. All pleasant things are good; all p a i n f u l things are bad. !i 9 V A l l things w h i c h partake of or produce p l e asure are pleasant.
The d i scussion in this passage proceeds as follows; P r o t a g o r a s agrees that JL, ¿ and ¿ express his v i e w s . Socrates infers ¿ f r o m ¿ and ¿. Protagoras denies 4 in its u n qualified form; he wi l l accept it only if it is qualified as; in ¿. Socrates links ¿ to 6, a viex* w h i c h he attributes Ot thé many. H e proposes 7_ as the v i e w w h i c h Protagoras ought to accept instead of ¿, And represents it as contrad i c t i n g ¿. ¿ is. P r o t a g o r a s ' v e r s i o n Of ¿, and'¿ is pre s e n t e d as an analytic truth. ¿ ' and V are m e r e l y repetitions of 6 and 7. The disc u s s i o n begins w i t h Socrates securing P r o t a g o r a s ' answers to three questions, and inferring a conclusion fr o m those ansers. Tie nee d to determine both the significance of the questions and the conclusion, ar*d;.the;.extent to w h i c h they can be taken as indicative of Socrates' ow n view.
In a s s enting to l· Protagoras mak e s it_clear that h e is p r epared to evaluate lives as good or bad. " L iving well" (eu zen) is a standard s y n o n y m for "doing/ faring well" (eiy pratteln) and "being happ y " (eudaimonein) 3). He thus ha s some c r i terion or criteria b y w h i c h he judges lives as good or happy, and his answers to ¿ a n d ¿ r e v e a l w h a t these are. In h i s a n swer to ¿ h e states that living a •3 (predominantly) painful life*is sufficient for not living well, and living a (predominantly) pl&ctant life is sufficient for living well. 4). These answers and their implications b e a r close attention.
If b e i n g a pl e a s a n t life is a sufficient co n d i t i o n for b e i n g a good life, it w i l l follow that a p r e dominance of p l e asure in a n y life is sufficient to qualify that life as a good one, n o m a t t e r h o w slight the predominance, and so also wit h a p a inful life. A l t h o u g h this v i e w does n o t d i s a l l o w the p o s s i b i l i t y that factors other than p l e a s u r e and pain m a y contribute to the goodness o r b a d n e s s of a life, such factors, n o m a t t e r h o w a b u ndantly they are p r e s e n t in a life, do n o t avail against pl e a s u r e and pai n to mak e ev e n a m a r g i n a l l y p l easant life bad, o r a m a r g i n al l y p a i n f u l life good. Since such factors cannot contribute to the goodness or b a d n e s s of;~a life c o mmensurably w i t h p l e asure and pain, it is doubtful that and y are intended to a l l o w for them. Further, the conju n c t i o n of 2 a n d 3, w i t h the r e a sonable a s sumption that a life predom i n a t e s either in pl e a s u r e or in pain, w i l l enta i l that b e i n g a pleasant life is the only sufficient condition for b e i n g a good life, an d b e i n g a p a inful life the on l y sufficient condition for b e i n g a bad life, a n d it w i l l further follow that livi n g (predominantly) p l e a s a n t l y is both a n e c e s s a r y an d a sufficient condition for living well. In hi s answers to 2_ and 3_ P r otagoras thus shows that he is committed to a h e d o n i s t i c e u daemonistic theory: living p l e a s a n t l y defines o r constitutes living w e l l or happily. 5).
In <4 Socrates infers from P r o t a g o r a s ' answers a thesis about the relationship of living p l e a s a n t l y to w h a t is good, and of living u n p l e a s a n t l y to w h a t is bad. 4_ mus t then b e understood in a suitable sense so that it does indeed follow from 2_and _3. L i v i n g plea s a n t l y has indeed b e e n shown to be good, and living painf u l l y bad, bu t to b e so in a strong sense: they are, respectively, a n e c e s s a r y and suf ficient good, and a n e c e s s a r y and sufficient evil. 6). If· a theory about w h a t is good in this stro n g sense is a theory about the d e f i n i n g conditions of living w e l l or b e i n g happy, then the theory implied in J2-4 is n o t h i n g short of evaluative hedonism.
Socrates has reason, therefore, to take Protagoras' answers to 2^and 3_as comm i t t i n g the sophist to hedonism, and he does so e x p l i c i t l y in 4. Is there any suggestion that £ -4 express S o c r a t e s ' own view? Some commentators, r e lying on the fact that Socrates customarily expresses h i s o w n v i ews as questions to w h i c h he invites the interlocutor's assent, c l a i m that L-J3 m a y b e taken as expressions o f a v i e w h e means to endorse, w h e t h e r sin c e r e l y o r ironically. 7). But this w i l l n o t w o r k here: S o c r a t e s ' questions do not s i mply h a v e the form, '*£?", b u t thé form, "do y o u think (say) that £ ? " Socrates w a n t s to e l icit P r o t a g o r a s * views, rather than to e x press h i s own,(cf. l e g e i s , b3; dokei s o i , b4; o u , .. soi dokei, b 6 , 7), and his questions p r o v i d e n o evidence for his ow n vie w s o n the matter. T h e y are simply diagnostic. As w e shall see in the next section, Socrates has some interest in obt a i n i n g P r o t a g o r a s ' views about the relation b e t w e e n pl e a s u r e and the good. P r o tagoras rejects 4_ as a statement expressive of his vi e w , _ a t least in its i m q u a l i f i e d form: it is not living pleasr.antly as such ( c f . ha p l o s , c7) that con stitutes l i ving well, for if it w e r e (one m i ght imagine h i m thinking), someone w h o lived-as a catamite (cf. G r g . 494e) w o u l d live well. Shr i n k i n g b a c k fro m this, P r otagoras emends Socrates' c o n clusion in 4^ to read that it is living in the enjoy m e n t of k a l a onl y that constitutes living well.
The qu a l i f i c a t i o n amounts to a s u r render of the v i e w that p l easure as such is sufficient for living well, and his subsequent a d m i s s i o n that some pains are good 9) suggests that h e gives up the v i e w that it is n e c e s s a r y as well. O n l y p r a i s e w o r t h y p l e a s u r e (the p l easure d e rived f r o m exper i e n c e s or activities w h i c h are kala) counts in deter m i n i n g the goodness of a life. He is thus admitting a stan dard o f v a l u e other than pleasure, and on e b y w h i c h pl e a s u r e s themselves are »· a p p roved as good o r d i sapproved as bad, so that o n l y p r a i s e w o r t h y p l easures are good, i.e., m a k e a c o ntribution to a good life. D i s g r a c e f u l p l easures are p r e s u m a b l y bad. If so, then his v i e w is that p l easure is as such n e i t h e r good n o r bad: only p r a i s e w o r t h y p l e asures are good, o n l y disgraceful ple a s u r e s are bad, and pleasures n e i t h e r p r a i s e w o r t h y n o r disgraceful are n e i t h e r good n p r b a d (cf. d4-7).
Socrates p r oceeds to associate P r o t a g o r a s ' v i e w w i t h a v i e w w h i c h h e assigns to the m a n y 10), viz., that some p l e asures are b a d and some p a i n s are good. O n the interpre t a t i o n of just given this a s sociation is ju s t i f i e d to the e x tent that _5 does indeed e n tail the first conjunct o f 6. B y acc e p t i n g 6 as a w h o l e (see n. 9) he accepts a v i e w w h i c h is w h o l l y i n c ompatible w i t h 4. 5_ a n d 6_ are not statements which, in So-rates' view, Protagoras ought to accept. H e rath e r i n sistently recom mends _7 instead. T mus t then be read in a w a y that w i l l m a k e evident its incompat ibility w i t h J5. N o w in _5 Protagoras mai n t a i n e d that a life is a good on e to the exte n t that it consists of p r a i s e w o r t h y pl e a s u r e s and not m e r e l y to the extent that it consists of pl e a s u r e as such. It is the import o f 7 to a f f i r m wha t w a s denied in 5. So 7 _ insists that it is m e r e l y q u a pleasant that a n y t h i n g (including a life) is good, an d thus that the restr i c t i o n on 4 i m ported b y _5 is improper. 11).
W h y does Socrates urge 7 _ against Protagoras' p r o f e s s i o n : of 5_ and the general v i e w of the re l a t i o n b e t w e e n p l easant a n d good w h i c h it implies? It is un i v e r sally assumed, certainly b y prohed o n i s t a 12), b u t also b y antihedonists, w h e t h e r th e y take Socrates to be ass e r t i n g h e d o n i s m i r o n l é a l l y in J_ >13)nor no t asserting it there at all 14) , that Socrates represents 2, as his own view. This assumption is n e v e r argued, and it is ope n to challenge. To u n derstand Socrates' use o f ? w e n e e d to recall the earlier steps in the argument. In s e c u r i ñ g / P r o t a g o r a s ' assent to 2_ and that Socrates and Protagoras c l a i m that it is e v i d e n t to the m a n y that these things are bad, etc.
There are quite decisive reasons i n favor of ( b ) . A g a i n s t (a) is the fact that o n its r e a d i n g Socrates w o u l d b e i d e n t i f y i n g n o t onl y himself, but also Protagoras as a hedonist, w h e n the sophist has p r e v i o u s l y re s i s t e d the imputation of h e d o n i s m to him. E v e n if Socrates has reason to thi n k that for all his d i s claimers P r o tagoras is at heart a hedonist, s u rely h e cannot represent h i m as such to others in his presence. In favor of (b) is the factvthat it fits w e l l in fcheáimmediate context. In the p r e c e d i n g lines (d6-e4) Socrates and Protagoras have b e e n d i s c u s s i n g b e t w e e n themselves w h a t the m a n y w o u l d say if ask e d a certain question; that is, they!--have b e e n p r e d i c t i n g h o w the m a n y w o u l d answer. H e r e they are b e i n g a s ked that q u estion directly, and the p r e d i c t i o n is b e i n g tested. W h a t "Protagoras and I are saying" w a s just said at d6-el. 17). The injunction given here 18) is Socrates' response to an o b j ection (356a5-/ 7) to the p r e c e d i n g argument w h i c h showed that the p o s i t i o n of the m a n y on akrasia is absurd. 19). Socrates disallows the ple a that one pl e a s u r e m a y b e p r e f erred to a n o ther simply b e cause it is n e arer in time. H e is thus s t r ictly enforcing the hed o n i s t i c principle, w h i c h hi s opponents h a v e accepted, that the only factor w h i c h mak e s one pleasure p r eferable to a n o ther is d i fference in q u a n t i t y (355d6-e2; 356a 1-5). The injunction has force o n l y against those w h o accept the h e d o n i s t i c p r i nciple on w h i c h the p r e c e d i n g argument against a k ragia d e p e n d e d , and so p r o vides n o independent evidence in favor of prohedonism.
"Since the salvation of our lives has turned out to consist in the right choice of p l easure and pain..."
On e m i g h t think that Socrates commits h i m s e l f to the truth of the statement contained in this clause, e s pecially i n the light of h i s contrast b e t w e e n this account of "the salvation o f our lives" and the two c l early counterfactual accounts m e n t i o n e d e a rlier (at 356c8-e4 a n d e 5 -3 5 7 a 5 ) . A n antihedonist account w o u l d require the p r é s e n t instance to b e counterf a c t u a l as w e l l for Socrates. B u t Socrates is hete m e r e l y r e c alling the appli c a t i o n of the result of the akrasia argument to choice and action (356a8-c3; cf. (c) above), w h i c h has force only against those w h o accept the p r emises of that argument. As before, Socrates is n o t i n cluding h i m s e l f amo n g those a g a inst w h o m the argument h a s force, though e q u a l l y h e takes n o pains to dissociate h i m s e l f fro m i t . 20).
(e) 357d3-7:
" F o r y o u too ha v e agreed that those w h o go w r o n g in choice of pleasures an d pains go w r o n g through lack of knowledge, -and these are goods and e v i l s , -a n d no t m e r e l y of knowledge, b u t of that w h i c h e a rlier w e agreed was knowledge of measurement."
The h y p h e n a t e d clause, though given in oratio o b l i q u a , represents, the v i e w of the many, and nee d no t be taken as e x p r e s s i n g Socrates* o w n view.
"This w o u l d be our answer to the many. A n d I as k you, H i p p i a s and P r o dicus (let the argument be shared b y you), w h e t h e r I s e e m to y o u to be s p eaking truly or falsely." It seemed quite e m p h a t i c a l l y to all that w h a t ha d b e e n said wa s true. "You agree, then (a r a ) , I said, "that the p l easant is good and the p a inful bad."· Pr o d i c u s smiled a n d gave h i s assent, and so did the others. "What about this, then, gentle m e n , " I said, " a r e n ' t all actions that a i m at p a i nless a n d pleasant l i ving p r a i s e w o r t h y (k a l a i ) ? A n d the p r a i s e w o r t h y a c c o mplishment good and benef i c i a l ? " The y all thought so.
In the sequel to the argument w i t h the m a n y w h i c h b e g i n s w i t h this passage H i ppias and P r o dicus are drawn into the discussion. The y are a s ked w h e t h e r they, too (as w e l l as Protagoras, w h o s e silence implies consent) accept as true "what (Socrates) has b e e n s a y i n g " . The sophists e x p ress their emphatic a p p roval of Socrates* argument. They I m mediately acknowledge that i n acc e p t i n g that argument they accept the thesis basic to it, that the p l e a s a n t is (the) good 21) and the p a inful (the) bad. Thus they take Socrates as not O n l y h a v i n g r e presented the posi tion o f the m a n y c o rrectly b u t also as sharing their hedonism.
22). Lik e Protagoras earlier, H i p pias an d Pr o d i c u s are prohedonists.
It does not follow, however, that they are right. Socrates' q u e stion her e is a g a i n a diagnostic one; do H i ppias and Prodicus think ( c f . doko hutnin) that Socrates ha s o f f ered a s o und argument? Their affirmative answ e r does not imp l y that Socrates takes the a r g ument to b e sound; he m a y think that it is m e r e l y valid. An d Socrates h a s go o d reason, as w e shall see, n o t to discourage their r e a d i n g of hi s position.
B y n o t c h allenging Socrates' inference (as P r o t a g o r a s h a d challenged another i n f e r e n c e to the same conclusion, 351b7-cl) the two sophists a n d p r e s u m a b l y a l s o P r otagoras, w h o does n o t repeat h i s former p r o t e s t 23), m u s t accept the hedonistic c r i t e r i o n for p r a i s e w o r t h y actions. C o ntrary to that p r o test ( ¿ above), that to k a l o n is the m e a s u r e w h i c h distinguishes good ple a s u r e s f r o m b a d ones, n o w that all p l e a s u r e h a s b e e n accepted as good, all ple a s u r e s must also be accepted a s k a l a i . The hedo n i s t i c criterion, coupled w i t h the a d mission that w h a t is p r a i s e w o r t h y is good an d beneficial, is used later in the argument (at 359e5-360a5) to argue for the un i ty o f courage and wisdom. Not onl y t h e m a n y b u t also the sophists ha v e overtly ac c e p t e d hedonism, a n d their acceptance of it can b e us e d b y Socrates to support pos i t i o n s w h i c h h e thinks they are w r o n g to deny.
The exami n a t i o n of the p r e c e d i n g texts h a s y i e l d e d the following results; (1) In non e o f t h e m are w e required b y a natural, uncons t r a i n e d reading o f the text to interpret Socrates' use of the h e d o n i s t i c thesis as i m plying h i s o w n endorsement o f that thesis. A n d (2) Socrates does n o t e x p l i c i t l y dis s o c i a t e h i m s e l f from h e d o nism, and does n o t h i n g to discourage h i s interlocutors fro m thinking that h e holds it. It w i l l n o w be out task to interpret Socrates' strategy in a w a y that makes sense o f these results. ; 25) . This is the argument :
(51) If one knows, that X is b e t t e r than Y, one w i l l w a n t X more than Y.
(52) If on e w a n t s X more than Y, one w i l l choose X rath e r than Y .
(53) Al l m e n desire welfare.
(S4) An y t h i n g else they desire o n l y as a means· to welfare.
(S3) an d (S4) represent w e l l k n own Socratic tenets, an d their conjunction, ' acc o r d i n g to Vlastos, entails ( S I ) . 26). The c o njunction o f (SI) w i t h (S2) (an app a r e n t l y u n controversial statement of the conn e c t i o n b e t w e e n desire and choice) e n tails the paradox: if one knows that X is b e t t e r than Y, one w i l l choose, X rather than Y. 27) Since Socrates has the resources to construct w h a t h e w o u l d r e g a r d as a sound argument for the paradox, one m a y w e l l w o n d e r w h y he resorts to another w h i c h he (as antihed o n i s t s w i l l claim) regards as unsound, e s p e c i a l l y if the premise w h i c h he rejects is at first also denied b y h i s interlocutor! Socrates takes some pains to get Prot a g o r a s to admit the premise, a n d though he is justified (as I have argued) in a t t r i b u t i n g it to the sophist, h e mus t think that it is w o r t h the pains. C l e a r l y Socrates thinks that the argument b a s e d on h e d o n i s m has greater cogency for P r otagoras and the o t h e r sophists than the argument from ( S 1 ) -( S 4 ) . And it does.
A n yone w h o doubts o r denies the Socratic p a r a d o x w i l l regard the argument from (S1)-(S4) w i t h suspicion just b e c ause it rules but· the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a k r a s i a , and anyone w h o believes that alcraela does occur w i l l ha v e r e ason to doubt one of m o r e p r emises in that argument. He w i l l c e r tainly reject (SI), and h e n c e at least one of (S3) and ( S 4 ) . (S4) is the likelier c a n didate for rejection. 28). The d o u b t e r w i l l m a i n t a i n that the o c currence of a k r asia proves the existence of w e l f a r e -i n d e p e n d e n t desires, a n d that the denial o f a k r a s i a o n the b a s i s o f the a l l e g e d non-exi s t e n c e of w e l f a r e -i n d e p e n d e n t desires m e r e l y b e g s the question a g a inst him. He m a y press his case b y claiming, a g ainst (SI), that e v enthough one k n o w s that X is b e t t e r than Y, one m a y still w a n t Y m o r e than X because, for instance, (one k n o w s or be l i e v e s that) Y is more pl e a s a n t than X. H e thus claims, against ( S 4 ) , that one's desire for p l e asure is a w e l f a r e -i n d e p e n d e n t desire.
There is o n l y one w a y for Socrates to dismantle this defense, and t h i s "is b y s h o wing that the defender of a k rasia is not en t i t l e d to h i s c l a i m that one's desire for pleasure is a w e l f a r e -or g o o d-independent desire. If that c l a i m can be d i smantled independently, (S4) an d (SI) w i l l no t be challengeable, for then a conflict b e t w e e n a desire for X qua good an d for Y q u a p l easant is no t p o s s i b l e . If to d é s i r e Y for its pleasure is just to desire it for its good ( c f . 354c3-5), the n it cannot e v e n b e claimed that though Y is mo r e pleasant* X is better.
This, I believe, is the advantage the argument f r o m h e d o n i s m has ov e r the ar g u m e n t fr o m (S1)-(S4) against a hedo n i s t i c opponent. An d against su c h an o p p o n e n t only. 29). Conceivably Socrates m i ght try to convert a non-he d o n i s t i c d e f e n d e r of a k rasia to h e d o n i s m first, in order to ex e r c i s e this advantage. W h e t h e r h e w o u l d ac t u a l l y do so, eve n given the license o f e r i stic convention, m a y be doubted. In a n y case h e is not doi n g it in the P r o t a g o r a s . H e does n o t argue for h e d o n i s m a g a inst P r o t a g o r a s ' protest, n o r against the many. H e has, as w e saw, good r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e that they are h e donists already, w h a t e v e r t h eir professions.
I f a n argument fr o m h e d o n i s m h a s greater c o g e n c y a g a i n s t a h e donistic opponent than s o m e alternative argument Socrates w i l l hav e good r e a s o n (a) to determine w h e t h e r h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r is a hedonist, p r i o r to l a u nching such an argument, and (b) to p r e s s hi s interlocutor, should h e be found to use h e d o n i s t i c c r i t e r i a of e v a l u a t i o n b u t to b e too confused o r too t i mid to a c cept the theory implied b y h i s evaluations, to accept that theory. Moreover, h e w i l l hav e good r e ason (c) to s u p p r e s s h i s own,dis a v o w a l of that theory. 
Tha t argument makes use of h e d o n i s m b y t a king a d v antage of the s u b s t itutability of '
'good" for "pleasant" (or "pleasure") and of "painful" for "bad", 32), and in thisway shows that the thesis of the m a n y that sometimes one does w h a t one knows to b e b a d overall, because one is overcome b y pleasure, to b e absurd; h o w can one ■ p o s s i b l y credit the expla n a t i o n given, that the agent di d w h a t h e did b e c a u s e h e w a n t e d p l e asure/goodness w h e n one of the givens in the descr i p t i o n of the act is the s t i p u l a t i o n that the agent k n e w that he w o u l d get less pleasu r e / g o o d n e s s from that act than f r o m some alternative e q u a l l y o p e n to him? That is like explaining som e o n e ' s informed choice of a less lucrative job b y his desire for money. The " l ogic of explanation" is vi o l a t e d if the expla n a t i o n o f f ered to mak e a n action intell i g i b l e conflicts w i t h the d e scription of the acti o n it explains. 33),
Doe s the great logical advantage w h i c h Socrates gains f r o m the us e o f h e d o n i s m in a r g u i n g a g a inst a k rasia i m ply that Socrates accepts hedonism? It c e rtainly n e e d not. First, to get this logical advantage, Socrates does n o t n e e d h e d o n i s m as such bu t a p r e m i s e w h i c h w i l l insure (a) that the goods o f bot h the c h osen and the re j e c t e d a l ternative are of the same kind, and (b) that it is b y à good of that k i n d that the agent is said to be defeated. It is i n d e e d h a r d to see w h a t other i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of good w i l l
satisfy (a) arid (b) so neatly, and so Socrates has good r e ason to use the hedo n i s t i c p r emise w h e r e h e can. This, however, does n o t mean that S o c rates h i mself accepts hedonism. If I can defend a v i e w of mine b y either o f two arguments, o n l y one of w h i c h I a c cept as :sound b u t w h o s e p r emises m a y be h a r d to defend, w h ile I regard the other as valid, dep e n d i n g o n p r emises some of w h i c h I do n o t accept, and I realize that the l a t t e r argument w o u l d h â v e greater c o g e n c y against someone w h o does accept these p r emises than the former, I ma y have e x c e l l e n t reason (especially if the context is eristic) to use the latter argument to d e f e n d m y view. This, I believe, is e x a c t l y the p o s i t i o n of Socrates in the P r o t a g o r a s .
Ill
I t is time n o w to consider an d evaluate some m a j o r o b j ections to a n t i hedonism and to p r e s s som e o b j ections to prohedonism.
(1) it is sometimes flatly a s serted that p r o h e d o n i s m is re q u i r e d b y a nat u r a l r e ading o f the text, a n d that antihedonists do v i o lence to the p l a i n sense of the text. Thus Grote finds h e d o n i s m "di r e c t l y stated" b y Socrates, 34), a v i e w that is e c h o e d b y Heclcforth an d Dodds 35), the latter c h a r a c t e r i z i n g antihe d o n i s t arguments as " m ore i n g e n i o u s than;:honest." The motives of antihed o n i s t s are also suspect; "The commentators resort to this (sc. antihedonist) hypothesis, p a r t l y beca u s e the d o c trine is one w h i c h (sic) they d i sapprove..." (Grote) ; "It is o n l y because h e d o n i s m is> a n a u g h t y v i e w that there are reservations about s a y i n g that Socrates m a i n t a i n s the P r o t a g o r a s ." (Crombiey p. 240) . "Scholars w h o resent the s u g gestion tfefc P l a t o eve r changed hi s m i n d hav e tried to p a p e r ov e r this crack in the 'unity* of h i s thought..." (Dodds) . These allegations h a v e b y themselves no pro b a t i v e force whatever.
(2) A mor e subst a n t
i a l o b jection is d e r i v e d f r o m the o b s e r v a t i o n that h e d o n i s m is not a p o s i t i o n to w h i c h e i ther
Protagoras o r the m a n y c l a i m to adhere? that position, it is claimed, is "forced" (Hackforth, p. 41) o n t h e m b y Socrates, and if h e d o n i s m is n o t the p o s i t i o n o f Socrates* opponents, a defense of a n t i h edonism w h i c h i n terprets Socrates* argument as ad h o m i n e m collapses. W h y else should Socrates try to pe r s u a d e t h e m to accept hedonism, unless h e thought that that v i e w w a s true? 36). The o b jection is a n swered if it can b e shown, as I hav e tried to do, that P r otagoras and the m a n y are, despite the i r disclaimers, hedonists, and thus opp o n e n t s against w h o m Socrates* h e d o n i s t i c argument against a k r a s i a w i l l b e effective. 
(3) It is frequently p o i n t e d out that Socrates continues to m a k e p r o f i t a b l e use of the h e d o n i s t i c p r e mise after the argument w i t h the m a n y is complete. P a r t l y on the strength o f this premise h e argues for the u n i t y of courage and wisdom, a thesis w h i c h he

." (his italics)
. It m a y be p o i n t e d out in response, however, that Socrates d e l i b e r a t e l y secures the sophists' conscious assent to the h e donistic p r e m i s e after the argument w i t h the m a n y is over (358al-6; cf. 1(f) above), a n d is thus careful to s o licit expl i c i t l y a license to c a r r y over hi s use o f that premise. I hav e tried to s h o w that h e has reasons to conceal hi s own v i e w of that premise. W h e t h e r that concealment is m o r a l l y justified o r w h e t h e r it m a k e s h i m liable to the charge of insincerity or d i s h o n e s t y w i l l d e pend on w h a t w e take to be p e r missible w i t h i n hi s strategy. W e should b e careful no t to reduce S o c r a t i c i r o n y to a m o r a l fault, n o r underrate the eristic cha r a c t e r of the discussion in the P r o t a g o r a s . 37). (4) I r win has argued, p. 106, that h e d o n i s m is indispe n s a b l e to a non-q u e s t i o n b e g g i n g a r g ument against a k r a s i a . A pri n c i p l e of " h e d o n i s t i c prudence" w h i c h combines ethical an d psychol o g i c a l h e d o n i s m is needed, h e argues, to give b a c k i n g to the Socratic doctrine that n o one w i l l choose w h a t h e k n o w s o r b e lieves to be the l e sser o f the available goods·(cf. his 3., p. 105). W h e t h e r o r no t that doc trine is a s s u m e d in the argument, the suit a b i l i t y of the ide n t i f i c a t i o n o f goodness w i t h pl e a s u r e to give b a c k i n g to that doctrine a n d its usef u l n e s s i n this argument is contingent on the fact that the o p ponent ha s a l r e a d y ac c e p t e d a pri n c i p l e of hedo n i s t i c prudence. I f the o p ponent h a d a c c e p t e d some o t h e r i d e ntification of the good, then that identification w o u l d h a v e served to give b a c k i n g to the So cratic doctrine. Th a t doctiine constitutes a general ps y c h o l o g i c a l c l a i m about w h a t e v e r one k n ows or b e l ieves to b e the good, a n d the p r i n c i p l e o f h e d o n i s t i c p r udence is one case of that claim. It is because the m a n y a l r e a d y accept the r p r ipcple that they must also accept the doctrine; bu t it does n o t follow that So crates mus t accept the principle because he accepts the doctrine. It is o n l y . b e c ause the (theory-independent) e x planation given of a k rasia b y the m a n y is the agent * s b e i n g overcome b y p l easure that Socrates ha s a n interest in mo u n t i n g his argument op a p r inciple o f h e donistic prudence, as e x plained above; ¿ t does not follow that Socrates h i m s e l f accepts that principle.
I have thus far argued that an antihedonistic r e ading of the Protagoras passage is fully plausible, and free fro m the objections that hâv e b e e n raised against it. Prohedonists m a y claim, however, that their r e ading is .equally
38) The verbal similarities b e t w e e n the thesis supposedly en d o r s e d in the P r otagoras and that attacked in the Gorgias are considerable, however, 39), and so mo s t prohedonists h a v e given o t her accounts of the discrepancy. Few are as radical as Grote, w h o dismisses attempts to address this problem; "Wè h a v e no right to require that (the dialogues) shall be consistent w i t h each other in d o c t r ine..." (p. 316). But although Plato does change his mind, sometimes drastically, h e n e v e r does so w i t h out suggesting reasons for the change, and w e hav e n o suc h reasons in the present case. In the Gorgias (which I assume to b e later than the Protagoras b u t still e s s e n t i a l l y "Socratic") h e d o n i s m is r e presented as the total antithesis of the . Socratic concept of the h a p p y life; Socrates is not r e p resented as h a v i n g sècond thoughts, as m o v i n g fr o m an old po s i t i o n to a n e w .one, b u t as implacably opposed to a p o s i t i o n w h i c h h e regards as w h o l l y d e s t r u c t i v e for h u m a n happiness. The p o s i t i o n of the A p ology and the Crito (both of w h i c h I assume to b e earlier than the Protagoras) is of a piece w i t h the G o r g i a s ,.and e q u a l l y at v a r iance w i t h a pr o h e d o n i s t i c P r o t a g o r a s . The appeals to the supreme importance of virtue and the p e r f e c t i o n o f the soul s e e m inconsistent w i t h the v i e w that pleasure is the good. We m i g h t try to h a r monize these appeals w i t h that v i e w b y claiming that virt u e and the p e r f e c t i o n of the soul are n e c e s s a r y and i n fallibly sufficient m e ans to pleasure and in that sense supremely important, an d suc h an attempt ha s b e e n ma d e recently b y Irwin. I can only say he r e that I do n o t think that the attempt is successful 40), n o r do other attempts s e e m promising. There is an irreconcilable incompatir b i l i t y b e t w e e n the c l a i m that virtue and the care of o n e 's soul is supremely important, and the c l a i m that p l e asure is the onl y ultimate good.
If Alternatively, the h e d o n i s m is Plato's own, an d a t e m p o r a r y flirtation. This is the v i e w of H a c k f o r t h (p. 42) w h o thinks that it is P l a t o ' s attempt to m a k e sense of the Socrâtic eq u a t i o n of virtue and knowledge, an a t t e m p t w h i c h he rejected w h e n he came to w r i t e the G o r g i a s . There is, however* e q u a l l y no e v i d e n c e outside of the' dialogues for this v i e w as there w a s non e for a h e d o n i s t i c Socrates (cf. Gulley, : p. 113), and it requires us to pos t u l a t e e q u a l l y uncha r t a b l e c h a nges of v i e w to him: if h e w r o t e the A p o l o g y an d Crito first, then h e w a s p r o b a b l y n o t a h e d onist to b e gin w i t h (assuming that these dialogues also represent P l a t o 's o w n views at the time). At some time thereafter, w h e n h e w r o t e the P r o t a g o r a s h e w a s a hedonist, and some further time after that, w h e n h e w r o t e the P h a e d o an d the Re p u b l i c (leaving aside the qu e s t i o n of the chronological relation of the. Gorgias to the P r o t a g o r a s ) , he rejected hedonism. The mo s t that can b e s a i d for a Pl a t o n i c interest i n h e d o n i s m at the time the Protagoras was w r i t t e n is that it m i g h t h a v e been, a "thought experi m e n t 1' , n o t s o mething w h i c h Pla t o s e riously believed, a n d p e r h a p s this is a l l that 
4.
A s s u m i n g that n o life is e i ther p u r e l y pl e a s a n t or p u r e l y painful. L i v i n g p l e a s a n t l y an d p a i n f u l l y are thus m a tters of degree, as are living w e l l and liv*ing badly. This w i l l a l l o w for a c o m mensurability b e t w e e n degrees of living w e l l and I l i ving p l e a s a n t l y w h i c h w i l l b e important for interp r e t i n g some later statements in the argument. See n. 11 below.
5.
I thus think that 2_ and 3^are mor e i m m ediately hed o n i s t i c than T a ylor (p. 164) suggests. At first sight goods o t her than p l e a s u r e an d e v i l s othe r u t h a n p a i n ares n o t ruled out, b u t if they are i n tended to h a v e some w e i g h t in d e t e r mining w h e t h e r a life of e x a c t l y equal pl e a s u r e an d p a i n (a m e r e t h eoretical possibility, s u r e l y ) is good or bad, an d can affect the d e gree of goodness o r b a d n e s s o f a life b e y o n d its degree of p l e asure and pain, then sure l y a large q u antity of such evils could suffice to m a k e a slightly p l e asant life bad, a n d a large q u a n t i t y o f such goods a s l i ghtly p a i nful life good. But 2_ an d 3^ do n o t a l l o w this; h e nce it is likelier that the y do n o t e n v isage goods o t her th a n p l e a s u r e an d e v ils o t her than pain.
6. That is, a good w h ose attainment constitutes l i ving w e l l o r b e i n g happy, and an evil w h o s e incurrence constitutes l i v i n g badly. The E u thydemus defines happi n e s s as the p o ssession of good(s), 278e; and the M e n o identifies such p o s s e s s i o n as the object o f desire, 77b-78b. ji should thus b e re a d as stating, no t m e r e l y that livi n g p l e a s a n t l y is ¿ good thing and living u n p l e a s a n t l y a b a d thing, b u t that they are that good and that evi l w h 10. This v i e w is e x p licitly a s s igned to the m a n y later (at 353cff.) w h e r e Socrates shows that though it appears to b e a denial of h e d o n i s m it can b e construed as consistent w i t h hedonism, a n d it is only o n suc h a c o n s t r u c t i o n that the m a n y are a l lowed to m a i n t a i n the .view, given their hed o n i s t i c c r i teria of· evaluation. Here, however, Socrates presses P r otagoras to d e n y it, w i t h o u t a l l owing h i m to con sider its hedo n i s t i c construction.
11. Thus 7 cannot be used to defend a n t i h e d o n i s m b y c l a i m i n g that it allows pl e a s u r e to b e a. good, o n e of a p l u r a l i t y of goods, as V l a s tos does (1969, pp. 76-8 and n. 24). I n context, the p u r p o s e of 7 . is n o t to state that p l easant things are good qua pl e a s a n t w h ereas other things m a y w e l l be good q u a s o mething else, b u t that all p l easant things, w h e t h e r they are p r a i s e w o r t h y o r not, a r e good m e r e l y qu a pleasant, and not qua pleasant in some specific way. Goods other than pleasure an d evils o t her than pa i n have a l r e a d y b e e n elim i n a t e d fro m consideration in the discussion (cf. hn. 5 and 6 above). The use of " k a t h * ho..· k a t a touto" (c4) and "k a t h ' h o s o n ... (kata t o s o u t o n , to be supplied b e f o r e k a k a at c6)" suggests bo t h a q u a l i t a tivecand 'a quantitative corre l a t i o n b e t w e e n b e i n g pl e a s a n t a n d b e i n g good; things are good in the ve r y respect in w h i c h the y are pleasant, and to the very d e g r e e to w h i c h they are pleasant. Since other goods and evils do not p l a y any part in the argument, T _ can be taken in a s t rong sense; things a r e good o n l y in the respect in which, : a n d to the degree to which, they are pleasant; b a d onl y in the respect in which, and to the degree to which, the y are painful. A mo r e explicit w a y o f ass e r t i n g the identity of goodness and p l e a s u r e could h a r d l y b e found, and 15o Protagoras* contempt for the m a n y h a s b e e n in evidence since 317a; cf. 352e3, 4 an d 353a7»3. His hesit i a t i o n to dissociate h i m s e l f f r o m the views o f the m a n y (a h e s i t a t i o n explicable b y w h a t w e k n o w o f hi s epitemology) is clear at 333c; c f . 359c.
16. The introd u c t o r y clause at c4, "ego gar l e g o " cannot he r e b e read as a state ment e x p r e s s i n g the speaker's view, for it introduces a direct q u estion and n o t an indirect statement, as that r e ading w o u l d require.
17. Tayl o r (p. 176) misses this b a c k w a r d reference of the clause. H e finds (b) "less attractive" than (a) but also thinks that " o n eith e r reading the sentence p r esents the d i fficulty that it asserts a una n i m i t y b e t w e e n Socrates and P r o tagoras w h i c h is not j u s tified b y an y t h i n g said previously." H e does n o t s a y w h y h e thinks that this is true for (b). 20. I n case on e is tempted to ¿ h i n k that Socrates does include h i m s e l f b y us i n g the first p e r s o n p r onoun h e m i n in "... e p h a n e i h e m i n i t should b e pointed out that this dative is possessive and m o difies lie soteria tou bioyt, as it clearly does at 356e5. 21. It is no t clear w h e t h e r einai h e r e indicates p r e d i c a t i o n or identity. Identi t y statements about the good sometimes lack the article, as e.g., at Philebus llb4. The absence of the article m a y b e e x p l a i n e d b y the m o n i s t i c tendency of Greek eudaemonism: if something is proposed as good in the sense that it provides the standard w h e r e b y other things are judged good, then given that tendency, it is the on l y such good or "the" good. This e x clusive use of the p r e dicate w a s already in evidence, I believe, at 351cl (= ¿ a b o v e ) . In a n y case, in the p r e sent passage the sophists* asáent is taken as an a c ceptance o f hedonism, for the assent is re c a l l e d at 360a3 as i m plying acceptance of the v i e w that if a n y t h i n g is p r a i s e w o r t h y an d good, it is pleasant. Prot a g o r a s must have changed h i s m i n d d u ring the p r e c e d i n g argument, at the point w h e r e the m a n y wer e supposed to b e pe r s u a d e d that they accept n o o t h e r standard of goodness than pleasure. Protagoras, however, n e e d n o t h a v e b e l i e v e d that Socrates w a s trying to p r ove the h e d o n i s t i c thesis; h e m a y simply hav e realized that h e h a d n o alternative standard of goodness to propose, w h e t h e r o n the many's b e h a l f o r on hi s own. As to thé v i e w that all p l e asures are n o w also k a l a i (as w e l l as good), Protagoras is n o w also committed to it: b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g good, n e u t r a l and b a d p l e asures earlier at 351b-e acc o r d i n g to w h e t h e r they w e r e praiseworthy, n e u t r a l or disgraceful, h e en d o r s e d the v i e w that if a pleasure is good, it is praiseworthy. N o w that h e appears to accept the v i e w that all pleasures are good, h e mu s t also accept the v i e w that the y are all praiseworthy. 26. Two auxiliary premises are n e e d e d to get the e n t a i l m e n t ; (1) If X and Y are b o t h m e a n s to one's w e l f a r e (= contribute to one's welfare) and one k n ows that X contributes m o r e tpjjne's welfare;than. Y, one w i l l w a n t X more ¿han Y; and (2) X is b e t t e r " t h a n If, i f f c o n t r i b u t e s mor e tp one's w e l f a r e t h a n Y, These auxil iary premises m a y e a s i l y bf. g r a n t e d Socrates, given t h e logical structure of his eudaemonism: If w e l f a r e is the only thing d e s i r e d for itself (S3), then the degree of one's desire for a n y thing else is commensurate w i t h the extent of the contribu tion one b e l i e v e s the .thing to,,make to one's welfare; a n d o n e 's c r iterion for j u dging one thinj» to , bebetter than,.another isjust the difference in the extent of their contributions. 30. Note that Socrates does no t take Protagoras up on his o f f e r to "examine" the issue o f the identity of pleasure and the good ( 3 5 1 e 3 -7 ) , and w i t h good; reason. If Socrates is no t a hedonist then to argue f o r the. i d e ntity exp l i c i t l y w o u l d be to compromise his non-hedonism, and to argue against it w o u l d undermine h i s own argument against a k r a s i a .
· . · ί 31. Protagoras' acceptance of the "power o f knowledge" thesis (352c8-d3) is h a r d l y consistent w i t h his own non-cogpitive v i e w of v i rtue.(his n o t i o n of "teaching" is quite unsocratic: it appears to b e little mor e than social conditioning; cf.
